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THE USE AND ABUSE OF PATENTS IN THE
SMARTPHONE WARS: A NEED FOR CHANGE
Jessie Yang
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Patent System was originally developed to help protect an
inventor’s novel idea and the market share that idea might generate in an
industry, thereby also promoting technological progress. The current
patent system, however, is “marked by limitless subject matter [and]
lenient public grant” leading to the abuse of patents by the mobile device
manufacturing industry. This issue has been underscored by the recent
phenomenon known as the “Smartphone Patent War” made up of a number
of high-profile cases, such as Apple, Inc. v. Samsung. Against this
backdrop, it is important to re-examine the U.S. patent system with respect
to smartphone patents, and consider workable alternatives to fighting the
smartphone war rather than the current focus on patent litigation, which is
costly and inefficient.

INTRODUCTION
The first smartphone was introduced in 1992.1 Its name was Simon, it
had a touch screen, and for $899, its owner could enjoy 30 to 60 minutes of
battery life to make calls, fax, e-mail, compute, and even play a game
called Scramble.2 Simon flopped in the market not too long after its debut.3
A decade would pass before smartphone production really took off,4 and
two decades before consumer ownership reflected the same enthusiasm.
As of 2012, however, the United States smartphone industry can finally
boast that smartphone usage outrivals that of its less-intelligent “feature”

1.

Ira Sager, Before IPhone and Android Came Simon, the First Smartphone,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Jun.
29,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-29/before-iphone-and-androidcame-simon-the-first-smartphone. (describing the introduction of the first
smartphone).

2.

Id. (describing Simon’s features).

3.

Id. (“By the time the phone hit theaters that summer, the phone was off the
market after its brief, six-month run before consumers.”).

4.

See generally Brad McCarty, The History of the Smartphone, THE NEXT WEB
(Dec. 6, 2011, 6:05 PM), http://thenextweb.com/mobile/2011/12/06/the-historyof-the-smartphone/ (providing a chronological history of the development of
smartphones since Simon).
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5
phone counterparts. Smartphone manufactures are commemorating this
accomplishment with flare—by waging war.
The “Smartphone Patent War,” as it is known, is a patent litigation
war. The United States patent system was designed to promote innovation
by protecting the original ideas of those who worked hard to conceive
them. But in a market attractive as the smartphone market (both in terms
of market players and the amount of media attention), onlookers are
concerned that the protections afforded under the patent system have
evolved into weapons to block competitors, risking the innovation that
patent protection seeks to promote. Against this backdrop, the time is ripe
to re-examine the U.S. patent system with respect to smartphone patents,
and consider workable alternatives to fighting a litigation war.
Part I of this Note gives the relevant background on the U.S. Patent
System, including the constitutional basis and intent. Part II examines the
use of patents specific to the Smartphone Patent Wars. Part III presents the
current landscape of the war and explores the different avenues for change,
reviewing and organizing the different proposals that legal experts have
made in an effort to remedy the smartphone over-patenting problem.
Finally, Part IV proposes a new framework for addressing the problem of
smartphone patent litigation, and briefly discusses the remaining issues that
would remain unresolved.

I.

BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
A.

The Original Intent of Patent Laws

United States patent law was established pursuant to the United States
Constitution in order to “promote the progress of science and the useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”6 This language
establishes two competing forces. Whereas most laws in the United States
are designed to prevent monopolies, patents are “the very rare example
where the government . . . give[s] [someone] a monopoly.”7 In the case of
patents, the government is willing to grant this temporary monopolistic
privilege as an “incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in
terms of time, research, and development.”8

5.

David Goldman, Half of U.S. Cell Phones Are Now Smartphones, CNN MONEY
(May
16,
2012,
12:48
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/16/technology/smartphones/index.html (arguing
that smartphones “eclipse ‘feature’ counterparts”).

6.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

7.

David Kestenbaum & Jacob Goldstein, How to Fix the Patent Mess, NPR PLANET
MONEY
(Oct.
23,
2012,
3:53
PM),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/10/23/163480928/episode-412-how-to-fixthe-patent-mess.

8.

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).

240

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014
The Use and Abuse of Patents
Stated differently, a patent is a trade-off between an inventor and the
State. When a patent is granted to an inventor, he or she holds the right “to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States for a limited time.” In exchange, however, he or she must
“public[ly] disclos[e] of the invention when the patent is granted.”9

B.

Limitations on Patent Protection

Because patent protection grants such monopoly power, U.S. patent
law is fraught with limitations on that power. These limits take several
different forms, including restrictions on the general scope of patentable
material, requirements that must be met in order to file specific patents, and
finite time periods for which granted patents are effective. Consider, for
instance, the requirements for a utility patent, or a “patent for innovation,”
which is by far the most common type of patent that the United States
Trademark and Patent Office (“USPTO”) issues.10 A utility patent is
granted “for the invention of a new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful improvement
thereof . . . for a period of twenty years.”11 Section 101 of the U.S. Patent
Act sets forth the general requirements for a utility patent,12 and has been
understood to include four factors. In order for an invention to be
patentable, it must be: (1) statutorily authorized (meaning it falls into one
of the five categories stated in the definition), (2) novel (different from
previous inventions), (3) useful, and (4) non-obvious (to someone who
understands the technical field of the invention).13
A second type of patent, a “design patent,” is one that protects the
appearance of an article and is governed by Section 171 of the U.S. Patent
Act.14 Design patents are granted for a period of fourteen years15 for “new,
9.

What Is a Patent?, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/patents.jsp (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (“A patent
is a property right granted by the Government of the United States of America to
an inventor ‘to exclude others form making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States’ for a limited time in exchange for public disclosure of the invention when
the patent is granted.”).

10.

See generally Types of Patents, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/patdesc.htm (noting that more
than 90% of patents issued in recent years are utility patents).

11.

U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9.

12.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).

13.

Daniel
A.
Tysver,
Patent
Requirements,
BITLAW,
http://www.bitlaw.com/patent/requirements.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014)
(outlining the eligibility requirements patentability); Qualifying for a Patent FAQ,
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/qualifying-patent-faq-29120.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014).

14.

U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 10 (“Design Patent – Issued for
a new, original, and ornamental design …”).
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original and ornamental design.”16 Unlike utility patents, design patents
need not be “useful.”17 However, both utility patents and design patents
must also adhere to 35 USC §112, which sets forth the requirements for the
“specification” of the invention. The specification requirements mean that
in theory, a person cannot merely patent a general idea or concept, such as
streaming movies over the Internet, but must restrict his or her patent to the
specific way in which that idea is executed, such as how he or she intends
to stream those movies.18

C.

The Current Climate

Despite existing restrictions on patents, the rate and scope of patent
grants in the United States has grown at an incredible rate since the
inception of the country’s patent process. Whereas it took the United
States “over a hundred years to get to the first million patents,” recent
statistics indicate that the USPTO is “granting a million patents every four
years.”19 These numbers raise an important question—are people today
that much more innovative than they were several hundred years ago, or
does the trend of growing patents reflect a more liberal grant of patents in
the current system?
Critics of the modern patent system suggest that most patent
applications filed today are no more than “enhancements or rip offs on
previous work,” including applications that the USPTO eventually
approves.20 Even current patent owners will admit that by today’s
standards, having more than a hundred patents to one’s name is not a
particularly notable achievement.21 This has led some to conclude that it is
“less and less the case that more patents mean more innovation,”22 and
even that “the economic impact of innovations today may pale in
comparison with those of the past.”23 Furthermore, the fact the UPSTO is
15.

Id. (“Please note that the fourteen year term of a design patent is subject to
change in the near future.”).

16.

35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).

17.

Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Why Design Patents Need Not Satisfy 25
U.S.C.
§
101?,
PATENTLY-O,
(Nov.
27,
2007),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/11/why-design-pate.html (noting that the
design “need not be useful”).

18.

Kestenbaum & Goldstein, supra note 7.

19.

Id.

20.

Holly Finn, A Patently Obvious Problem, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22-23, 2012, at C12.

21.

Id.

22.

Matthew Yglesias, America’s Patent Crisis, SLATE MAGAZINE (July 5, 2012, 4:49
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/07/patents_innovatio
n_and_the_america_invents_act_how_a_new_law_encouraging_more_efficient_
patent_processing_could_stifle_american_innovation_.html.

23.

Has the Ideas Machine Broken Down?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2013, at 21.
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currently understaffed, which leads to a less-than-sufficient, perfunctory
examination of most patent applications, is believed to exacerbate the
issue.24
These concerns are perhaps most prominently highlighted in the recent
“Smartphone Patent War,” embodied by the slew of recent lawsuits filed by
many major mobile device manufacturers, including Apple, Google,
Samsung, Microsoft, Nokia, Motorola, HTC, and others, as they battle for
supremacy in the smartphone market.25 The competition itself is no
surprise given how valuable the market is right now,26 but rather the form
of that competition that draws criticism. Rather than arming themselves
with teams of engineers or otherwise investing resources into developing
new technological ideas,27 smartphone manufacturers are arming
themselves with patents. In 2011, the amount that Apple and Google spent
on patent lawsuits and “unusually big-dollar patent purchases” exceeded
the amount spent on research and development of new products.28 Amidst
the growing litigation and ensuing media attention that smartphone
companies have garnered,29 there is an increasing concern that the practice
of “wanton patent-granting” may create a problem where patents not only
fail to promote innovation, but in fact hinder it, eventually making it
24.

Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC
(July
12,
2012,
10:20
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-manypatents-in-america/259725/ (explaining that there is currently a three-year delay
between the filing of a patent application and a decision on whether the patent is
granted).

25.

See Sascha Segan, Infographic: Smartphone Patent Wars Explained, PC
MAGAZINE
(Jan,
19,
2012,
2:46
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2399098,00.asp (“There’s a war on, and it
could hit your smartphone. A slew of lawsuits are rocking the smartphone
industry. . . .”).

26.

See Sara Forden, FTC Staff Said to Formally Recommend Google Patent Suit,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201211-01/ftc-staff-said-to-formally-recommend-google-patent-suit.html (estimating
that global revenue in the smartphone market reached $219 billion in 2011);
Smartphones Account for Half of All Mobile Phones, Dominate New Phone
Purchases
in
US,
NIELSEN
WIRE
BLOG
(Mar.
29,
2012),
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/smartphones-account-for-halfof-all-mobile-phones-dominate-new-phone-purchases-in-the-us/ (identifying the
smartphone over feature phone choice as a growing trend).

27.

Segan, supra note 25 (“There’s a war on, and it could hit your smartphone. A
slew of lawsuits are rocking the smartphone industry as nearly every major
manufacturer fights to get cash from the others for using its patents, to block its
opponents’ products from being imported into the U.S., or just to bleed out their
energy paying for lawyers rather than engineers.”).

28.

See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2012, at A1. (“Last year, for the first time, spending by Apple and Google
on patent lawsuits and unusually big dollar patent purchases exceeded spending
on research and development of new products, according to public filings.”).

29.

See, e.g. infra Part II(B).
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“practically impossible to build anything without violating a patent of some
kind.”30

II. PATENT USE IN THE SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY
A.

The Emergence of the War and General Strategies

The main patent weaponry the smartphone industry employs is known
as “defensive patenting,” which may be something of a misnomer.
“Defensive patenting” works by blocking competition falling within a
patent’s scope—not because it is necessary to prevent copy-catting, but
because the patent-holder wants to ensure he is not infringing when he
brings his own product to market.31 This offers an advantage to
smartphone manufacturing companies with valuable patent portfolios; if
the company has enough relevant patents, it is able to monopolize its
market.32 As a result, many smartphone manufacturers strategically buy
other companies for their patents. Take, for example, Google’s August
2011 purchase of Motorola Mobility, Inc., which included the acquisition
of some 17,000 patents belonging to Motorola.33 Google’s own press
release about the merger openly admitted that “Motorola’s patent profile
will help protect the Android ecosystem.”34 When “defensive patenting” is
used in this manner, it effectively becomes an offensive strategy.
While some say that the number of patents a smartphone manufacturer
owns is not as important as the substance of those patents,35 it is worth
noting that a quarter million patents might touch a single smartphone.36
30.

Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, WIRED, Nov. 13, 2012, at 209.

31.

See Posner, supra note 26 (“Defensive patenting means getting a patent not
because you need it to prevent copycats from making inroads into your market,
but because you want to make sure that you’re not accused of infringing when
you bring your own product to market. The cost of patenting and the cost of
resolving disputes that may arise when competitors have patents are a social
waste.”).

32.

See id. (“A patent blocks competition within the patent’s scope and so if a firm
has enough patents it may be able to monopolize its market.”).

33.

See Victoria Slind-Flor, Google, Nokia, Easyjet, Yahoo!, UMG: Intellectual
Property,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
4,
2011,
7:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-04/google-nokia-easyjet-yahoo-umgintellectual-property.html (“Google Chairman Eric Schmidt said the $12.5 billion
acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. may spur competition among
phone makers using its Android software, and the company won’t play favorites
with its partners.”).

34.

See Facts About Google’s Acquisition of Motorola, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/press/motorola/ (detailing Google’s acquisition of
Motorola).

35.

See Laura Marin, Charlie Wolf & Dan Medina, Patent Wars: War Zone
Economics,
NEEDHAM
INSIGHTS
(Apr.
18,
2012),
http://www.researchfindr.com/patent-wars-war-zone-economics-0.

36.

Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Patent Shifts to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/technology/apple-samsung-trial-highlights-
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When coupled with the fact that patent infringement claimants need not
prove the defendant knew he was infringing,37 the patent-numbers game
arguably becomes a fairly attractive option.

B.

Specific Patent Weaponry Mechanisms

The ways in which patents are used vary on a case by case basis, but
the collection of high-profile Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd,
cases offers an interesting case study.38 This particular dispute between
Apple and Samsung began in April 2011, when Apple filed a design patent
infringement claim against Samsung, alleging that Samsung had violated
Apple’s Design Patent No. D618677 (‘677 Patent),39 which protects the
general shape and appearance of its popular iPhone.40 In particular, one of
Apple’s claims was against the Samsung’s Galaxy S 4G and Infuse 4G
phones—which arguably appear similar in their rounded edges and screen
position41—and so Apple sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit sales
of those Samsung devices.42 Samsung responded to Apple’s actions by
patent-wars.html?pagewanted=all (“In smartphones, some analysts say, the sheer
number of patents and the speed of innovation in product development undermine
the power of patents. Because a smartphone combines many communications and
computing technologies, as many as 250,000 patents may touch the device,
according to estimates by RPX, a patent licensing company.”).
37.

Posner, supra note 26 (“Judges have difficulty understanding modern technology
and jurors have even greater difficulty, yet patent plaintiffs tend to request trial by
jury because they believe that jurors tend to favor patentees, believing that they
must be worthy inventors defending the fruits of their invention against copycats
even though, unlike the rule in copyright law, a patentee need not, in order to
prevail in an infringement suit, show that the defendant knew he was
infringing.”).

38.

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL
7036077 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 4490558 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012); Apple Inc.
v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 4097751
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2527044 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012);

39.

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL
7036077 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011).

40.

U.S. Patent No. D618677 (filed Nov.
http://www.google.com/patents/USD618677.

41.

See,
e.g.,
SAMSUNG
GALAXY
S
4G,
http://www.samsung.com/us/system/consumer/product/sg/ht/95/sght959habtmb/t
959_400x400_large1_cf.jpg (last visited Mar. 23, 2014); see also SAMSUNG
INFUSE
4G,
http://www.samsung.com/us/system/consumer/product/sg/hi/99/sghi997zkaatt/inf
use4G_marquee_bullet1.jpg (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). The images of the
Samsung Galaxy S 4G and Samsung Infuse 4G phones illustrate Samsung
phones’ similar physical appearance to the popular Apple iPhone.

42.

U.S. Patent No. D618677 (filed Nov.
http://www.google.com/patents/USD618677.
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bringing patent infringement countersuits in U.S. Federal Court against
Apple relating to wireless network technology.43 Continued strike and
counter strike escalated the initial dispute into a patent battle in just four
months—by August 2011, there were 19 ongoing lawsuits between the 2
companies in 12 courts across 9 countries on 4 continents.44 This presents
a dangerous precedent of excessive and arbitrary litigation that is costly,
inefficient, and fought over something that many consumers believe should
have never been patented in the first place.45
Sadly, the collection of Apple v. Samsung cases illustrates only one
small facet of the war. Smartphone patent wars are by no means restricted
to design patent infringements, and also widely incorporate utility patents
as well, such as those revolving around Apple’s “slide-to-unlock” feature.46
Furthermore, in addition to these types of “general” infringement claims,
the smartphone industry has a special kind of patent weaponry at its
disposal, known as the “Standards-Essential Patent” (“SEP”).47 In order for
certain functions on a person’s smartphone, such as Wi-Fi, to work
universally, every manufacturer must adhere to the same standard.48 These
standards are decided on by a committee, and ultimately involve many
different patents which are owned by different companies.49 Since this
provides a strong incentive for a company to be the standards patent43.

Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple Are Suing Each Other, PC
MAGAZINE
(Sep.
14,
2011,
12:59
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2392920,00.asp.

44.

Id.

45.

Richard Finger, Patent Lawsuits: The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous, FORBES
MAGAZINE
(Nov.
26,
2012,
12:20
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2012/11/26/patent-lawsuits-the-goodthe-bad-and-the-frivolous/. The initial lawsuit resulted in a jury award of $1
billion for Samsung after three days of deliberation. See Nick Wingfield, Jury
Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent Case (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-applesamsung-patent-trial.html?_r=0. See also John C. Dvorak, Why Apple Actually
Lost
to
Samsung,
PC
MAGAZINE
(Aug.
28,
2012),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2409010,00.asp (“People in general
reacted with astonishment that anyone could get a patent for a curve or straight
line or flat surface. This sent two messages through the brains of consumers:
First, this is an idiotic patent and Apple is grasping for straws. Second, the
company is spending too much time on minutiae rather than functionality.”).

46.

Mikey Campbell, Continuation of Apple’s ‘Slide-to-Unlock’ Patent Covers
‘Open-to-App’ Functionality, APPLE INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/12/10/09/continuation-of-apples-slide-to-unlockpatent-covers-open-to-app-functionality.

47.

Charles Arthur, Apple, Samsung, Google and the Smartphone Patent Wars –
Everything You Need to Know, (Oct. 22, 2012, 3:45 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/oct/22/smartphone-patent-warsexplained (defining SEPs as “patents that are essential to a standard.”).

48.

Id.

49.

Id.
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holder, the following agreement is enforced: If a patent is “standardsessential,” then the patent-holder must agree to license that patent to other
companies who want to implement that standard on a “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (“RAND”) basis.50 What constitutes a “reasonable”
licensing price and what “non-discriminatory” actually means are in
dispute, and contention over SEP practices constitute a significant amount
of the ongoing patent war litigation.51

C.

Defenses Against Infringement Claims

Having reviewed different ways in which a patent infringement claim
can be brought against a smartphone manufacturer, it is important to
examine how they can be defended against. In the event of a patent
infringement claim by Company A, there are three general ways for
Company B to defend itself:
(1) B can invalidate A’s patent by either arguing there is prior art or
that it fails the §101 four-factor test and should never have been granted in
the first place;
(2) B can show that A’s patent does not apply to the technology at
issue in the lawsuit because B does something different; or
(3) B can show that it has already paid for A’s patent through an
existing licensing agreement (AKA patent exhaustion), or that the amount
of payment being demanded by A is unreasonable.52
To illustrate these defenses, consider Apple’s “slide-to-unlock” patent.
Since Apple’s slide-to-unlock patent only involves dragging an object
across a linear path,53 Company B can cleverly evade an infringement
lawsuit by avoiding the mechanism used in Apple’s patent and instead
having an object which can be dragged in a non-linear path to a target
location.54 This is, in fact, the basis of the Android unlock system.55
The above illustration is for general patent infringement cases. Where
the dispute involves an SEP, only the last defense is effective.56
Furthermore, a RAND-encumbered patentee company cannot bully a

50.

This is also referred to as “FRAND” in Europe, where an ‘F’ is appended for
“fair.” Anne Layne Farrar, A. J. Padilla, & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing
Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of
FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 671, 671 (2007).

51.

Arthur, supra note 58.

52.

Id.

53.

U.S. Patent No. 8046721 (filed Jun. 2, 2009) (issued Oct. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.google.com/patents/US8046721.

54.

Arthur, supra note 47.

55.

See,
e.g.,
WE
LIVE
SECURITY:
ANDROID
UNLOCK
SCREEN,
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wpcontent/media_files/AndroidUnlockScreen.png (illustrating the 9-dot passcode
system used by modern Android phones).

56.

Arthur, supra note 47.
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competitor by refusing to license SEPs and instead seeking an injunction
against that competitor’s allegedly patent-violating devices.57

III. REVIEW OF ISSUES AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES
A.

Re-Examining the Path of the War

The Smartphone Patent War, popularized by media attention given to
high-profile cases, has attracted the attention of legal professionals,
including academics, commentators, judges, and practitioners. It is
difficult not to take notice, given the staggering amount of litigation
flooding the courts. In less than seven years, the top ten smartphone
manufacturer litigators have amassed over 1,100 smartphone patent
lawsuits as either plaintiff or defendant, including 142 such lawsuits
involving Apple alone.58 Major smartphone manufacturing companies
continue to focus their resources on litigation to fight the smartphone war
despite proving to be both costly and a quick way to make enemies.59
Meanwhile, start-up companies are greatly disadvantaged in entering the
market because they must worry about spending their money on a legal
team.60 Some observers go as far as to claim that if the smartphone war is
allowed to continue on its current course, it will only end in mutually
assured destruction.61 Even if that is not the case, patent use in the
smartphone industry has proven to be offensive rather than defensive,
abusive rather than incentivizing, and contravenes the very intent of the
patent system. Clearly, the time is ripe to re-examine the war, and ask
what could and what should be done to ensure the continued innovation
that the patent system was designed to promote.

B.

The Problems with Smartphone Patent Litigation: Review of the
Issues

Given the complex set of issues associated with over-litigation in the
Smartphone Patent Wars, it is important to step back and dissect the
different components of the war. First, there are the patents themselves.
57.

Id.

58.

Fighters
in
a
Patent
War,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
7,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/08/business/Fighters-in-a-PatentWar.html.

59.

See supra Part III(A).

60.

Will $Billions in Patent Lawsuits Kill Smartphone and Tablet Innovation?,
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL INTERNET CAUCUS, (Oct. 16,
2012)
[hereinafter
Netcaucus
Podcast],
available
at
http://www.netcaucus.org/audio/2012/20121016mobilepatents.mp3.

61.

See, e.g., Steven J. Vaughn-Nichols, Mutually Assured Destruction:
Google/Motorola vs. Apple, ZDNET (Aug. 20, 2012, 12:28 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/mutually-assured-destruction-googlemotorola-vs-apple7000002887/ (discussing the dangers of losing a patent lawsuit to a rival and
arguing that big technology companies stay out of patent wars against each other
because of the zero-sum implications).
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Recall that a single mobile device draws upon hundreds of thousands of
patents issued to many different parties, which greatly increase the chances
of patent infringement disputes. Second, these parties may be smartphone
manufacturers who use the patents, or they may not be practicing entities at
all. The third component involves the types of infringement claims that
these parties bring, which, for the purposes of this Note, can be divided into
three categories: design patent claims, SEP claims, and utility patent
claims. And finally, there is the court system which resolves infringement
disputes. Each of the four components mentioned above contributes a
possible avenue of change, discussed in greater detailed below.

C.

Review of Possible Remedies
1.

Patents

As an initial matter, the root of the problem goes back to the patents
that are involved in a smartphone. Since there is no easy way to reduce the
number of patents that make up a mobile device, the other option would be
to examine their issuance by the USPTO. As previously mentioned, the
number of patents issued today far outweighs the pace and scope of patents
granted previously in our nation’s history,62 and the concern is that this is
happening despite the absence of any evidence that Americans are actually
becoming any more innovative.63 Instead, patents are being granted too
liberally: for descriptions of inventions that are overly broad, such as an
idea rather than a specific method (in contravention of 35 US § 112), and
for items that are obvious (in contravention of 35 US § 101).64 Included in
the intersection of this might be what one might call “frivolous patents,”
such as the page-turn patent65 that Apple now owns. The page-turn patent
embodies the animation of a page in a physical book being turned,66 which
is all too familiar to anyone who has watched Disney cartoons that begin
with the opening of a storybook—all of which predate the filing of Apple’s
patent.67
62.

See supra Part I(C) (outlining the current state of patent issuance and patent scope
rates).

63.

Kestenbaum & Goldstein, supra note 7 (discussing recent inconsistent decisions
in the smartphone industry).

64.

See id.

65.

Although the page-turn is more specific to tablets than smartphones, it provides a
good example of a patent that crosses over and is both too broad and too obvious.
See U.S. Patent No. D670,713 (filed Dec. 19, 2011), (issued Nov. 13, 2012) (This
is a patent for “[d]isplay screen or portion thereof with animated graphical user
interface.”).

66.

Nick Bilton, Apple Now Owns the Page Turn, (Nov. 16, 2012, 2:23 PM), THE
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/apple-nowowns-the-page-turn/ (criticizing the patent system for granting Apple a patent that
essentially mimics turning a book page on an electronic device such as an iPad).

67.

The original Disney film; Robin Hood (1973), provides one such example. See
The Adventures of Winnie the Pooh (1977).
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The reason for the over-issuance of patents may be because not only is
the USPTO understaffed, it is particularly understaffed in the type of
people who understand the technology that makes up smartphone patents. 68
Furthermore, research suggests that the USPTO issues patents in industries
where more fees are expected to be generated, which provides misaligned
incentives.69 One way to rectify the over-issuance of patents would be to
hire more experts at the USPTO to examine smartphone patent filings and
look for and deny patents that are overly broad and obvious to someone
who is familiar with smartphone technology. These experts would be paid
according to a different incentives scheme than other USPTO patent
granters so that they could provide a counterbalance to the misalignedincentives problem. Although it might be costly to implement, the benefit
would be that it would require no changes to current patent legislation since
it only affects its implementation.
A second way to limit the number of patents would be to implement
structural changes to the types of patents that are granted, making the
requirements for getting particular types of patents stricter. One example
of this is to adopt the European patenting standard for patents involving
software that requires software patents to have a technical effect to be
patentable..70 An example of a product with such a patentable technical
effect a computer program which can cause a computer to do something
like “display items on screen, store a particular pattern in a memory,
activate a peripheral device, or at the very least, cause certain electrical
currents to run over particular connections.”71 The key effect of the
difference here is that business methods are ordinarily patentable in the
United States, while this is not usually the case with the European
standard.72
Finally, in addition to reducing the number of patents, new legislation
could limit the time period for which those patents are valid. This is a
reasonable suggestion for the smartphone industry for several reasons.
First, it is an industry where many patent ideas quickly become outdated

68.

See Netcaucus Podcast, supra note 60 (discussing whether recent patent litigation
is necessary and whether companies can innovate around intellectual property
disputes).

69.

Id. (restating the claims and views of Marvin Ammori, panelist and principal of
Ammori Group Steering Committee, Engine Advocacy).

70.

See Arthur, supra note 47 (discussing the smartphone patent wars between Apple
and Google).

71.

Software Patents Under the European Patent Convention, IUS MENTIS (Oct. 1,
2005), http://www.iusmentis.com/patents/software/epc/.

72.

See Nice Try, Amazon: ‘One-Click’ Payment Too Obvious to Patent, THE
REGISTER,
(July
7,
2011,
9:00
GMT),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/07/07/european_patent_office_says_amazon_o
neclick_payment_too_obvious_to_patent/ (explaining that “methods of business
cannot be patented unless they solve a technical rather than administrative
problem.”).
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within a year or two anyway.73 Second, the industry does not have the same
characteristics as one that requires multi-year patent protection, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, in which it is costly to research and develop a
drug and where the effective patent term is shortened by drug testing
conducted before sale of the drug74.

2.

Plaintiffs

The plaintiff bringing a patent infringement claim related to
smartphone technology or design can be anyone who holds that patent. If
restrictions are placed on patent lawsuits so that only parties who actually
use the patents within a specified period of time can bring a lawsuit, or else
they lose the patent,75 then the number of infringement suits would be
greatly reduced. This would also eliminate many instances of patent
trolling, as previously defined,76 since these parties do not produce in the
industry. This suggestion is in fact justified by the original intent of the
constitutional provision, which seeks to protect innovators, which nonpracticing parties cannot claim to be. Furthermore, because patent
ownership is transferrable via mergers and acquisitions, enforcing a use-itor-lose-it policy on patents would also ensure that manufacturers buying
other companies for their patent portfolios are actually doing so for
innovative business reasons, and not just amass patent weapons.

3.

Claims

Google, in defending Motorola against Apple, recently made an
interesting argument around SEP claims. Google, who has been accused of
abusing its SEPs, argues that just as there are standards-essential patents,
there should also be commercially essential patents—patents that “cover
features that are so popular as to have become ubiquitous” and should be
considered de facto standards.77 Google further argues that withholding
these commercially essential patents—which can be interpreted to include
both design and utility patents—is just as harmful to consumers and the
competitive marketplace as withholding SEPs.78 Naturally, Apple took
73.

See Netcaucus Podcast, supra note 60 (discussing whether Congressional
legislation is necessary to address increasing pace of mobile device innovation
and competition).

74.

See Posner, supra note 24 (discussing general problems created by the structure
and administration of patent laws and the need for revision by public officials).

75.

See id.

76.

See supra Part III(A) (discussing the use of patents in the patent war between
smartphone manufacturers).

77.

John Paczkowski, Google Says Some Apple Inventions Are So Great They Ought
to Be Shared, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (July 20, 2012, 3:05 PM),
http://allthingsd.com/20120720/google-claims-popularity-has-made-some-applepatents-de-facto-essentials/ (suggesting that “proprietary non-standardized
technologies that become ubiquitous due to their popularity with consumers
should be considered de facto standards”).

78.

Id.

251

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014
The Use and Abuse of Patents
great exception to Google’s proposal in its response. Apple points out that
standardizing technologies allows for interoperability, while nonstandardized technologies create competition and drive innovation. In
other words, from Apple’s perspective, there is “a big difference between
technology that became so popular because it was adopted as an industry
standard and technology that became popular because consumers fell in
love with it.”79 If those two intellectual property distinctions are blurred,
then that removes a key incentive for innovators to innovate.
While arguments made by Google and Apple obviously provide
skewed perspectives that are driven by each company’s own ulterior
motives, they do draw out the important distinctions between the three
different types of patent claims. The fact the three types of patent
infringement claims in the smartphone industry—those involving design
patents, utility patents, and SEPs—are distinguished at the USPTO level
gives reason to believe their infringement claims should also be dealt with
differently. One way to make this distinction is to analyze these
infringement claims in terms of whether the patents can be “innovated
around,” meaning whether smartphone manufacturers could easily design
ways to get around the patent so as to avoid infringement.80 Starting at one
end of this spectrum, the easiest patents to innovate around are design
patents, which manufacturers have proven to be able to avoid81 with a
relatively small time investment.82 On the other extreme, SEPs, being
essential to standards, are very difficult to innovate around, if it is even at
all possible.83 And in the middle, there are the utility patents.84 Thinking
in terms of this tri-categorical system allows for a framework at the
USPTO patent-granting level in terms of deciding whether to issue a patent
and for how long, as well as at the court level for different standards of
review of each type of infringement claim.

4.

Courts

Since the courts are responsible for reviewing smartphone patent
infringement claims, their job is really to interpret and apply patent laws.
Obviously then, the more case law defines and confines viable patent ideas
and the specific implications for the smartphone industry, the better the
chances that the amount of smartphone patent litigation will diminish. In
this respect, courts have taken some steps toward enforcing certain patent
79.

Id.

80.

See Netcaucus Podcast, supra note 60 (discussing whether recent patent litigation
is necessary and whether companies can innovate around intellectual property
disputes).

81.

See supra Part III(B) (discussing litigation between Apple and Samsung
regarding design infringement by Samsung of Apple iphone’s general shape and
appearance).

82.

Netcaucus Podcast, supra note 71.

83.

Id. (discussing the three different types of patent claims).

84.

Id.
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requirements that should help narrow the number of patents grant. For
instance, a recent Supreme Court case discussed the obviousness
requirement with respect to gas pedals and sensors, holding that the
combination of two independently novel ideas is obvious, and therefore did
not constitute appropriate patentable subject matter.85 While this has had
some impact on software patents in the smartphone industry,86 it does not
retroactively affect the multitude of patents that are already in existence.87
Other court-level changes include limiting the remedies that courts
could make available to injured parties. For example, legal experts also
urge that during the decision-making process, courts should consider
patents in perspective; one infringement or alleged infringement should not
be grounds for an injunction against sales of the device as a whole.
Furthermore, judges themselves are advocating for more educational
programs to educate judges deciding patent cases on smartphone
technologies,88 which would give them a greater knowledge base to draw
on when making a ruling.

5.

Do Nothing

After having explored the possible remedies within each of the four
component parts of the patent wars, the discussion turns to the existence of
a fifth option: do nothing. Those who believe that the smartphone war does
not require Congressional action advocate this “self-regulation” or “waitand-see” approach. The legal experts who support this approach generally
believe that the current smartphone patent war is not an original revolution,
and thus nothing to be concerned about. They further believe that, with
time, private solutions will arise on their own.
In the 1850s, America experienced its first “patent thicket,” a phrase
referring to the situation where “too many patents covering individual
elements of a commercial product are owned by different entities.”89 The

85.

KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been
used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”).

86.

See, e.g. Stone Strong, LLC v. Del Zotto Products of Florida, Inc., 455 Fed.
Appx. 964, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“When there is a design need or market pressure
to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options
within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is
likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”)

87.

Kestenbaum & Goldstein, supra note 7 (stating that there are over one million
software patents).

88.

Posner, supra note 24 (arguing that because it is difficult for judges to understand
modern technology, there is a need to “provide special training for federal judges
who volunteer to preside over patent litigation”).

89.

Adam Mossoff, America’s First Patent Thicket: Sewing Machine War of the
1850s,
IP
WATCHDOG
(May
3,
2012,
1:07
PM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/05/03/americas-first-patent-thicket-sewing-
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intellectual property issues in a patent thicket are the same as with the
anticommons problem with real property, where excessive fragmentation
of ownership rights “increases transactions costs, accentuates hold-out
problems, and precipitates costly litigation, which prevents commercial
development of the affected property.”90 In this case, the affected property
was the development of the sewing machine, and newspapers referred to it
at the time as the “Sewing Machine War.”91 Eventually, the use of a patent
pool and cross-licensing agreements ended the war and allowed
manufacturers to produce the sewing machine.92
Proponents of the idea that the smartphone industry will self-regulate
base their assertions on observations from the Sewing Machine War. They
believe that the concerns regarding the Smartphone Patent War today
mirror those that were once related to the Sewing Machine War, such as a
lack of expertise in the field.93 Drawing further comparisons, there was
even a non-practicing entity in the sewing machine war, who owned a
patent instrumental to the modern sewing machine and used it to “litigate[]
himself into fortune and fame.”94 Moreover, they hold that patent wars
occur with “every single major leap forward,”95 and the smartphone patent
wars are just another example of this, requiring no governmental action. In
fact, changing the patent system now might even be a bad move, because
the “worst thing” that can happen is to “signal to [smartphone
manufacturers and patent trolls] that the rules are going to change . . . about
who has rights,”96 because it just provides an incentive to hold out longer.
Thus, advocates of self-regulation believe that the best thing to do with the
smartphone patent war is simply to wait it out.

IV. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A.

Discrediting the ‘Do Nothing’ Approach

The ‘Do Nothing’ approach may be a feasible solution for other patent
disputes, but not for the smartphone patent war. This is the case because of
machine-war-of-the-1850s/id=24521/ (discussing the first patent pool in
American history).
90.

Id. (explaining that the patent thicket concept is based on the theory of the
anticommons in real property, “which arises when there is excessive
fragmentation of ownership interests in a single parcel of land.”).

91.

Netcaucus Podcast, supra note 60.

92.

Id. (discussing how the use of the patent pool allowed patent owners to escape
commercial blockage).

93.

Id. (comparing the Smartphone Patent War and the Sewing Machine War).

94.

Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZONA L. REV. 165, 182 (2011)
(describing the role Elias Howe Jr. played in the sewing machine war).

95.

Netcaucus, Podcast, supra note 71.

96.

Id.
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three important distinctions. First and foremost, the smartphone patent war
litigation is not really a patent thicket in the same sense the sewing
machine war was. With the sewing machine war, the idea was to combine
different patents to manufacture, for the first time, an instrument that would
be the sewing machine. With smartphones, however, the device has
already been invented and manufactured. While this difference may seem
nuanced, it has some important implications. For instance, with the sewing
machine, the costs of patent litigation greatly outweighed the benefits of
creating a new invention. More importantly, the sewing machine patent
holders were all entering a new market by agreeing to cooperate, and
would be placed on a more or less even playing field. In the smartphone
patent wars, the patent rights-holders are trying to block competitors out of
a market they are already in. Smartphone patent war litigators, therefore,
do not have the same incentives to cooperate and come up with a private
solution, such as cross-licensing. Furthermore, the patent wars greatly
disadvantage new entrants to the market, such as start-up companies.
Secondly, the argument that it would be bad to signal to smartphone
patent litigators that their rights are going to change is moot. The reality is
that courts are already headed down that path. In fact, given that the
litigators are competitors in the market, what one party perceives as its
“rights” are going to change no matter what a court decides.
Finally, even if it is true that there have been symptoms of a patent war
with ever major industrial or technological leap forward, there has never
been a patent war of this magnitude, where some experts fear the only
outcome may be mutually assured destruction. That possibility warrants
some sort of active efforts to change the situation, rather than just sitting
back waiting and hoping for the industry to sort itself out.

B.

The Proposal

Finding the right way to deal with the over-patenting problem requires
a balance between a clean-cut simple solution that lacks specificity in its
application, and one that is more nuanced but effective. This proposal thus
combines clear-cut, universally applicable rules with respect to who can
bring a patent lawsuit with more nuanced rules for what sorts of patents
should be issued by the USPTO and by whom.
Finally, it gives
suggestions on the proceedings at the court-level.

1.

Rule for Patentees: The Use it Or Lose It Policy

The first part of the proposal is a simple clear-cut rule: implement a
use-it-or-lose-it policy with respect to mobile device technology. Holders
of mobile device technology—which would include technology for tablets
or other devices that might be easily developed and transformed for a
smartphone platform—should have a certain amount of time in which they
must implement their patent into a product sold on the market. After that
time period, if the patent holder does not use that technology in a marketed
product, then he, she or it loses the rights to it. A procedure that would
allow the patentee to apply for a time extension in certain cases, such as in
the case of a developmental delay, where the patentee clearly still intends
to use the patent but needs more time to implement it into the final product,
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would complement this solution.97 This rule would help eliminate much of
the patent troll litigation from the smartphone wars who are clearly gaming
the system98 in clear violation of the constitutional intent of the patent
system, rather than “promot[ing] . . . the useful arts.”99 It would also help
control the practice of manufacturers buying out other manufacturers to
acquire their patent portfolios.
Unlike some other industries such as pharmaceuticals,100 the mobile
device industry is particularly well-adapted for a use-it-or-lose-it rule.

2.

Changes to the Patents and USPTO

Since the USPTO is understaffed, and since there are so many
problems implementing patenting laws that are already in existence about
patentable subject matter, it makes sense to hire some additional help. The
USPTO recognized this same problem and sought to solve it, in part, by
making efforts to hire some 1,000 additional patent examiners for 2012.101
But instead of these new employee hires, the USPTO should really
appropriate that hiring budget toward the hiring of more independent
contractors.102 This approach to hiring would offer several advantages.
First, it is possible that independent contractors may help counteract any
misaligned incentives trend, 103 since they would be paid to examine a
narrower scope of patents in which they have particularized knowledge.
More importantly, however, independent contractors would be experts who
understand the smartphone and mobile device industries and could make
97.

Although not a perfect practice, this would also hopefully serve as some
protection to the inventor who genuinely wants to protect his idea but has not yet
come up with the resources to do so, so that such inventors are not inadvertent
casualties of a rule designed to target patent trolls.

98.

See supra Part III(A) (discussing the patent trolls that take advantage of the patent
system to exact tolls on other companies).

99.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

100. See Posner, supra note 24 (describing the pharmaceutical industry as the “poster
child” for the patent system, and arguing that “few industries resemble
pharmaceuticals” because they are instead characterized by low cost of invention
or a competitive advantage just by being first in a market, and stating these
industries would “get along fine without patent protection.”).
101. David J. Kappos, USPTO FY 2012 Budget Request, U.S. PATENT
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
(Mar.
12,
2011),
available
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kappos_house_2012budget.jsp
(presenting the USPTO budget for 2012).

AND

at

102. The idea to hire independent contractors is not entirely novel, as the USPTO pays
independent contractors to examine certain international patents. See e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Contracts International
Patent
Application
Searches
to
Commercial
Firms,
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2005/05-48.jsp (announcing contracts the USPTO
awarded to foreign companies in a Patent Cooperation Treaty search pilot
program).
103. See supra Part IV(C)(1) (discussing research results that indicate the USPTO
issues patents in industries that can generate more fees).
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judgments on novelty and obviousness and the general frivolousness of a
patent from the perspective of someone who is familiar with the
technologies of the industry. This should help reduce the number of
patents being issued in accordance with the legislative intent, which will
greatly help the amount of smartphone patent litigation down the line.
In addition to new hires at the USPTO, it would further be helpful to
implement some changes to the patents themselves. For this, the
categorization of the three types of patents is useful. Since design patents
are easy to innovate around, they should receive few changes, if any. The
data is probably insufficient at the moment since the smartphone market is
still relatively young, but if and when data allows, it might be worth
investigating the actual term of the average design patent in the smartphone
industry—how long it is used in practice—to see if fourteen years is
excessive.104 For now, however, it is sufficient to leave design patents
alone because the possibility to innovate around them allows avoiding
infringement.
On the other hand, SEPs are necessary for implementation of certain
smartphone capabilities and their use is thus sometimes unavoidable, and
so they would require more changes. To this end, the experts at the
USPTO who are responsible for issuing smartphone-related patents (or
even a different set of experts) should conduct research into what “RAND”
should mean. Furthermore, current practices do not require a patentee to
notify the USPTO when his patent becomes an SEP patent, but they should
so that a RAND licensing price or agreement may be associated with that
patent.105

3.

Changes at the Court Level

Just as the USPTO could benefit from experts, so too could the court
system. Judges are rarely patent experts, particularly where technological
patents are concerned, and neither are the average citizens who sit on the
juries of infringement lawsuits. If judges are better educated on patents
and the technology behind them, they are able to make better judgments
about whether a lawsuit is frivolous, has no merit, and should be dismissed.
If a case does go to a jury trial, an understanding of patent technologies
would also help a judge properly instruct the jury. In this respect, judges
who deal with patent litigation should receive at least a cursory training of
the issues involved. If this is successful, it is worth considering
implementing a patent-infringement-specific court system so that there are
patent judges who are equipped to deal with specific patent issues.
However, small changes should precede big structural overhauls, and thus
this proposal does not explore this suggestion any further.

104. See supra Part II(B) (stating that the life of a design patent is fourteen years).
105. Netcaucus Podcast, supra note 60 (discussing the deficiencies in current practices
related to Standard Essential Patents).
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C.

Unresolved Issues

While the above framework addresses many of the issues plaguing the
smartphone patent war, it is nonetheless important to point out some of the
unavoidable shortcomings. For one, any new legislation would not only be
hard to pass, it would take time to pass. Furthermore, even after the
legislation did pass, there would then be an issue of whether the law would
apply retroactively to include existing patents. In the meantime, patent
issuance would continue to build up for obvious or frivolous or overly
broad patents, and there would be no way to counteract that. Secondly, the
passage of the America Invents Act, changing the United States from a
first-to-invent to a first-to-file system,106 makes it difficult to predict the
impact on smartphone patents. Finally, even if U.S. laws change or case
law establishes specific rules regarding smartphone patent litigation, it
would have no impact on smartphone lawsuits happening in other
countries.
In a time when interdependency between countries and
international trade is so prevalent, it is difficult to imagine the impact of
national laws on a global phenomenon.

CONCLUSION
The Smartphone Patent War and the problem of over-patenting and
over-litigation is a symptom of the faltering state of the United States
Patent System. The United States Patent and Trademark Office is severely
understaffed. The number of patents the United States Patent and
Trademark Office issues is at an all-time high while innovation is not.
Rather than protecting innovators and promoting technological advances,
the main role patents play in the smartphone industry is to fend off
competitors and keep out new entrants to the market, such as small start-up
companies that cannot afford to compete in litigation. It is clearly time for a
change.
The proposal above allows for a foreseeable end to the war that
balances simplicity of execution with effectiveness. By instituting a
handful of changes at the USPTO level, the plaintiff level, and the court
level, the large number of smartphone patent infringement cases would
greatly diminish. And hopefully, the possibility of only ending the war
through mutually assured destruction will materialize.

106. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Implementation, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 23,
2014) (providing information regarding the implementation of the America
Invents Act). See also Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Historic
Patent Reform implemented by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Sept. 17,
2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-59.jsp (announcing that most
provisions of the America Invents Act went into effect).
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